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Abstract. Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from
constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of pow-
ers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European
demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not suf-
ficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of
direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and
lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction
of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European
democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent
assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power.
A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federal-
ism.
Keywords: European Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights, Separation of Powers, Com-
petitive Federalism, Referendums, European demos.
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1. Introduction
The EU is in the process of giving itself a constitution.
1 The document entitled ‚ Draft
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ has been agreed upon by the European
Constitutional Convention on 10 July 2003 and proceeded to the Italian Presidency on 18 July
2003.
2 The draft has not found the consent of the European heads of state at the intergovern-
mental conference in Brussels on 13 December 2003, but member states continue the negotia-
tions in 2004. In case the Constitutional Draft is not adopted by the member states of the EU,
                                                                
* Revised version of my Inaugural Lecture held at the Philipps-University of Marburg on 9 May 2003. –
Forthcoming in Public Choice 2004.
1. There is a controversy among European legal scholars as to whether a European Constitution already
exists. Although the European Treaties and directives take precedence over national laws and contain
many of the usual constitutional contents, their constitutional character is denied for example by the
German Constitutional Court (BVerfG 89, 1993) or Grimm (1994), a former judge of that Court, because
the EU lacks a European identity. Whether this shortcoming is coped with by the Constitutional Draft
must be questioned as well. At least, however, it is politically considered to be a constitutional draft.
2. See http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.de03.pdf.3
some countries, in particular France and Germany, think about establishing a closer union
among smaller groups of states such that a Europe of variable geometry results.
3 The Constitu-
tional Draft resembles the existing Treaties as well as the Bill of Rights in one document, but
additionally contains several changes or new provisions aiming at a deepening of European in-
tegration.
Such a deepening of political integration is however controversial. There have for example
been discussions about the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers which have led to the
failure of the negotiations at the Brussels summit. Art. I-24 of the Constitutional Draft estab-
lishes new criteria for majority voting in the Council according to which a simple majority of
member states and three fifths of the population (represented by the heads of state) of the
Union shall suffice to enact policies that are not subject to the unanimity requirement. This pro-
cedure is supposed to start in 2009. The weighting of votes shall then be dropped. Poland and
Spain have strongly objected against this new procedure by arguing that the large member
states could dominate the smaller states if the weighting of votes were dropped. It can be ex-
pected that the new double majority proposal will indeed enhance the number of minimum
winning coalitions in the qualified majority procedure at the EU level such that smaller member
states have reduced blocking abilities. The EU’s ability to act would however be increased.
Another controversial topic in the political discussion accompanying the constitutional proc-
ess is found in a newly created President of the European Council who could be elected for a
five years’ term at maximum. He or she is supposed to represent the EU in foreign affairs, but
also to help accelerating decision-making processes at the EU level. This proposal is called the
‘double hat’ solution because the President of the European Council competes with the Com-
mission President, but also with the supposedly created EU minister of foreign affairs in several
respects. Political economists disagree as to whether this or, more generally, which govern-
ance model at all is useful for a European executive. Berglöf et al. (2003) and Tabellini
(2003a) prefer a presidential model with an elected Commission president who also presides
the European Council. The latter would become more effective without reducing the position
of the Commission in the balance of powers. The European Constitutional Group (2003)
supports the double hat solution though with a shorter term of the President of the European
Council, while Vaubel (2003) is generally skeptical about the European Constitutional Draft.
The debates illustrate the fundamental problem that the Convention has faced by formulat-
ing the Constitutional Draft and the heads of state will face in their decision about the future
shape of the EU: Europe has to decide whether the final goal of European integration should
be a federation or a confederation. Blankart and Mueller (2003) discuss the consequences of
this choice for political decision-making procedures in the EU. If member states wanted to
establish a confederation, the Council, or the European Council respectively, should be the
main decision-making body of the EU. The single nation states would then be members of
such a treaty. In addition, several competencies the EU currently possesses would necessarily
need to be returned to the member states. If a federation were the final goal of European inte-
                                                                
3. In an article in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 20 December 2003 with the ti-
tle Die Lehren von Brüssel (p. 9), the French minister of external affairs, Dominique de Villepin, sug-
gests to continue the constitutional process as a kind of further integration between France and Ger-
many which will establish a nucleus that is open for the other member states.4
gration, legislative and executive powers should be adequately assigned and a certain govern-
ance systems be chosen among, e.g., presidential or parliamentary, single chamber or two
chamber systems. In that case, European citizens would be the members of the constitutional
treaty. The (European) Council could not keep its current decision-making powers in a fed-
eration, but could play a role as the second chamber of parliament.
Still, the EU is far from being a federation. However, its current competencies considerably
exceed those of a confederation. In addition, much speaks in favor of the EU developing to-
wards a federation despite all irritation that follows the failure of the Brussels summit in 2003.
The predominant goal since the Treaty of Rome is an ever stronger integration. Moreover, the
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice have incentives to
achieve a fully fledged political integration in Europe, because it increases their competencies
and hence their political powers.
4 If the EU is indeed developing towards a federation, it is
necessary to consciously and actively decide upon a European state and its future institutions.
A considerable concentration of powers at the EU level must be restricted by safeguarding
mechanisms that help to prevent the center from abusing its powers. A further creeping cen-
tralization of competencies in the EU that leads to a high concentration of powers at the Euro-
pean level, without establishing effective mechanisms of democratic control entails unaccept-
able risks. It would thus be advantageous to centralize certain competencies to the EU level,
like, e.g., defense or internal security policy, and additionally create political decision-making
procedures which legitimate and control central European policies much more strongly than
today. This new set of rules should also contain procedures to assign and transfer competen-
cies to different levels of government as well as to resolve conflicts in the EU.
In that respect, it is very much telling that mainly the competencies of the current and future
European executive as well as the decision-making procedures in the Council are hotly de-
bated. It appears to be of secondary importance whether and how the democratic deficit of
the EU is resolved.
5 This is not even seriously attempted by the Constitutional Draft. The ex-
tension of decision-making powers of the European Parliament (that is included in the Consti-
tutional Draft) will not increase the legitimacy of political decisions at the EU level. In a deci-
sion on the compatibility of the Maastricht Treaty with the German Basic Law, the German
Constitutional Court argued in 1993 that the EU decisions lack a comparable legitimacy to po-
                                                                
4. Even if several more recent decisions of the Court provide evidence against its integration promoting
role, the overwhelming evidence up to now speaks in favor of that interpretation. See Voigt (2003). The
U.S. history also indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court decided in favor of centralization of competen-
cies in cases of doubt. The Anti-Federalists were fully aware of such a development: „ The judicial
power will operate to effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible manner, what is evi-
dently the tendency of the constitution - I mean, an entire subversion of the legislative, executive and
judicial powers of the individual states. Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any question
that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general government, will affect the limits of the state
jurisdiction. In proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be
restricted.“ (Antifederalist #11 of 31
st January 1788, in Ketcham (1986)).
5. For a discussion of the democratic deficit see Boyce (1993), Abromeit (1998, 4) and Hug (2002, 8). The
democratic deficit does not only consist in the difficulties of refusing re-election of the Council as the
main decision-making body. The Council composition is only changed indirectly in national elections
and via national government changes. The core of the democratic deficit consists moreover in the lack
of influence of EU citizens on policy outcomes at the EU level.5
litical decisions at the German Federal level as established by Art. 38 GG (Basic Law) be-
cause of the non-existence of a European public, a European demos. Grimm (1994) con-
tends that the existence of such a European identity would be the major step to turn the Trea-
ties into a constitution. Abromeit (1998, 32) calls this argument the ‘no-demos thesis’: A
constitution is democratic only if it is based on a collective entity, like a ‚people‘ or a ‚nation‘
that has a common culture, common traditions and experiences, in short: a common identity,
the conscience of being ‚European‘. Even if decision-making powers of the European Parlia-
ment are extended by the European constitution, its majority decisions will not legitimate Euro-
pean policies because of the lacking demos.
6
In this paper, the thought experiment is made that the EU will finally be a federation. Such a
deepening of political integration in Europe is not evaluated positively or negatively. The func-
tional preconditions of a European federation are also not legally elaborated. The analysis is
focused instead on two central propositions on a future European constitution which ensure
that political decisions of the European federation follow citizens’ preferences. In Section 2
basic arguments from constitutional political economy are summarized that argue for a restric-
tion of decision-making powers in general. Means for reducing the democratic deficit in the
EU are discussed in Section 3. Based on the arguments concerning the lack of a European
demos mentioned above, it is argued in a more detailed fashion that an extension of the pow-
ers of the European Parliament will not suffice to resolve the democratic deficit. Instead, ele-
ments of direct democracy in a European constitution may help to create a European demos.
Moreover, referendums and initiatives allow for a stronger control of the European legislature
and executive than could be achieved in the current institutional environment. The introduction
of direct democratic institutions in the EU constitution is thus the first proposal on the Euro-
pean federation that is formulated in this paper. Following the proposal by  Feld and
Kirchgässner (2003) the introduction of a mandatory constitutional referendum as well as
constitutional and legislative initiatives in the European constitution are discussed. In Section 4,
competitive federalism is considered as the second proposal for the future European federa-
tion. Concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
2. Why does the EU need a constitution?
Constitutional political economy has interpreted a constitution as an (implicit or explicit)
contract between individuals that provides them with an insurance against expropriations by
other individuals (Buchanan 1975). By rejecting any organic normative justifications of the
state, like the divine right of kings or natural law, political legitimacy can be derived from an
initial contract as a foundation of the law and the state (Höffe 1999, pp. 48). In a Hobbesian
initial situation, individuals are free to do what they want to because they are not restricted by
other individuals’, nor by state coercion. Without the state, selfish individuals have however in-
centives to expropriate their fellow citizens or even to threaten their lives. Buchanan (1975,
12) describes this problem in the following way: “The issue is one of defining limits, and
anarchy works only to the extent that limits among persons are either implicitly ac-
cepted by all or are imposed and enforced by some authority.” If individuals do not want
                                                                
6. The German Constitutional Court added that European policy will only be legitimate if the German Par-
liament can withhold considerable decision-making competencies. See BVerfG 89, 1993, 155-213.6
to rely on the implicit acceptance of their privacy by others, they will voluntarily subordinate to
the law and to a coercive power, the state, that enforces the law, because it entails mutual
benefits as compared to anarchy. Individual conflicts are resolved by an impartial third party
such that individual property rights are secured to the largest possible extent. In addition, this
newly created state helps to organize and enforce individual co-operation in the provision of
collective goods that are as well to the mutual benefit of a large number of individuals in a pol-
ity. The state helps to overcome free riding and to solve social dilemmas. The blueprint for
such a voluntary agreement is found in a basic initial contract.
The early contractarians, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, in recent times also Rawls
(1971) interpret the contractarian reconstruction of the state as a thought experiment accord-
ing to which it turns out to what set of political rules individuals could potentially agree. Wick-
sell (1896), Buchanan (1975, pp. 147) or Buchanan and Tullock (1962, 96) emphasize the
importance of a real and practical agreement of the citizens subordinating to a constitution. An
explicit agreement is necessary because the state has itself incentives to exploit citizens and be-
have as a Leviathan. From that point of view, an indispensable need for constitutional rules
follows that prevent the state, and the politicians, bureaucrats (and interest groups) that con-
stitute it, from abusing their powers. The design of constitutions should be such that bad and
incompetent governments can be prevented from doing too much harm.
7 “The passions of
men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint” (Hamil-
ton, Federalist No. 15, quoted according to Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1787/1788, 110).
The government must subordinate itself to the rule of law. Checks and balances laid down in
the constitution help to create sufficient political competition such that dominant positions of
specific centers of power in a polity cannot emerge.
The constitutional discussion in the EU is far from the Hobbesian initial situation. The indi-
vidualistic starting point of the contractarians does however allow to evaluate the European
Constitutional Draft at basic principles. Three institutions are particularly suited to restrict the
state authority such that it is forced to respect basic individual rights, does not assume illegiti-
mately concentrated powers and considers the interests of the highest possible number of indi-
viduals in a jurisdiction (Höffe 1999, Chap. 4). These institutions are the rule of law, the
separation of powers and democracy. The rule of law must be secured by high requirements
for changes of fundamental rights and by an independent judiciary. Rights which can be
changed arbitrarily cannot be interpreted as basic rights (Buchanan 1975, p. 106). They
could be secured by first requiring that a revision must not lead to a change in the substance of
their contents (eternity clause). Or, the change of fundamental rights may be restricted by
higher majority requirements such as (quasi-) unanimity in parliament or a qualified majority in
a referendum. There is hence a trade off between the principle of democracy (with lower ma-
jority requirements than unanimity) and the rule of law. Unanimity prevents the suppression of
structural (ethnic, religious, racial) minorities. However, fundamental rights are also relative
rights (Hayek 1979, p. 416). The habeas corpus right has a lower value in countries with high
levels of terrorism than in those without terrorism (Mueller 1996, pp. 216).
Moreover, any potential rules might not qualify as fundamental rights. The EU’s Charter of
Fundamental Rights which the Convention proposes for acceptance by the European Council
                                                                
7. See Hume (1741); Popper (1945); Buchanan (1975).7
does not exclusively follow the requirements of a catalogue of fundamental rights. Mueller
(2003, pp. 23) argues that several of these rights are not fundamental, are contradictory or re-
dundant, or simply comments on certain issues. For example, Art. II-35 of the Charter pro-
poses a high level of health protection and Art. II-37 as well as Art. II-38 propose high levels
of environmental and consumer protection. Art. II-33 offers families social protection. It is
highly questionable whether these are fundamental rights and how they can be guaranteed. A
contradiction can be found with respect to discrimination. According to Art. II-21, each dis-
crimination because of sex (and 16 other criteria) should be prevented. Art. II-23 Paragraph 1
proposes equality of men and women which may already have been obtained under Art. II-
21. However, Art. II-23 Paragraph 2 explicitly allows for discrimination in favor of the un-
derrepresented sex. Is discrimination prohibited or allowed for?
Less contested than the definition of fundamental rights is the requirement of an independent
judiciary which is supposed to protect citizens from offenses by the state. Independence of the
judiciary additionally signals that the government of a country subordinates to the rule of law
which is a credible commitment of the state to respect private property rights. The protection
of private property rights is a precondition for private investment in human and physical capital
and hence positively contributes to economic growth. Finally, judicial independence is an ele-
ment of the separation of powers and enhances the competition between centers of power.
Art. I-28 as well as Art. III-258 to Art. III-289 of the Constitutional Draft strengthen the legal
independence of the European Court of Justice.
8 It may however be criticized that judges are
appointed for a three years’ term only with a potential renewal because this procedure pro-
vides incentives to judges to behave friendly to governments of particular member states. Art.
III-262 of the Constitutional Draft attempts at reducing these incentives by requiring that
judges can only be appointed after consulting a council that consists of former judges of the
ECJ, members of national highest courts and reputed legal scholars. Instead of a mere consul-
tation, it would have been desirable to establish stronger restrictions, like, e.g., the ability of
that council to postpone an appointment or to require the member states to nominate alterna-
tive candidates in cases of dispute.
Separation of powers considerably enhances political competition in a state. As govern-
ment and parliaments consist of individuals that are continuously tempted to misuse their pow-
ers, a cautious treatment of the concentration of powers requires the separation of powers to
different institutions by the constitution. Montesquieu (1748, 586) hence proposes to establish
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary in such a way to keep each other effectively in
check: „Tout serait perdu si le même homme, ou le même corps des principaux, ou des
nobles, ou du peuple, exerçaient ces trois pouvoirs: celui de faire des lois, celui
d’exécuter des résolutions publiques, et celui de juger les crimes ou les différents des
particuliers.“ Because of the separation of powers a mutual control of decisions of each in-
                                                                
8. Feld and Voigt (2003) provide systematic evidence for the impact of judicial independence on eco-
nomic growth by constructing a de jure and a de facto indicator. Whereas the de jure indicator of judi-
cial independence is obtained from the constitutional and legal provisions of single countries, the de
facto indicator captures actual independence. In this data set, the EU is at the 57
th rank from 106 coun-
tries in the case of de jure, but at the 1
st rank in the case of de facto independence.8
stitution is possible.
9 Laffont (2000, chap. 3) formally shows that this leads to a reduction of
corruption and abuse of powers. The information disadvantage of citizens as compared to
politicians is reduced by the separation of powers. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997)
additionally show that the separation of powers is more effective in presidential than in parlia-
mentary systems because the possibilities of the legislature and the executive to collude are
higher in the latter.
10
These thoughts about the separation of powers strongly contradict the proposal by Bodin
(1576) to ensure the sovereignty and ability to act of a government. The requirement of more
effective decision-making procedures at the EU level originates from the premise of sover-
eignty. It is frequently underlined that neither the Council nor the Parliament will be able to take
decisions after the next round of enlargement of the EU (Tabellini 2003a). The Constitutional
Draft considers these criticisms and attempts at establishing more effective decision-making
procedures. As mentioned in the introduction, Art. I-24 of the Constitutional Draft requires a
double majority of the member states and three fifths of the population of the European Union
for qualified majority decisions in the Council. The additional criterion of a qualified majority of
the weighted votes of the Council members as established by the Nice Treaty shall be
dropped by 2009. The same holds with respect to EU budgetary procedures. According to
Art. III-310 of the Constitutional Draft, the current distinction between compulsory and non-
compulsory spending shall be abolished. Tabellini (2003a) and Vaubel (2003) correctly criti-
cize that both changes will potentially enhance the legislative activities of the EU and entail a
further centralization of competencies in the EU. Hayek (1979, p. 429) argued that it is not the
sovereignty of the government, but the restrictions imposed upon it that constitute the main
purpose of a constitution. The changes in the decision-making procedures entailed by the
Constitutional Draft are hence only acceptable if they are met at least by an increased ability of
citizens to control European politics.
An increase of control could be obtained by a stronger separation of powers in the EU.
Currently, an imbalance of powers to the disadvantage of the Parliament exists. While the
Commission has agenda setting power, the Council, in many cases even the heads of states in
the European Council take the most important decisions at the EU level. The Parliament has a
co-decision power in less important policy areas. Even though its position in the budgetary
procedure, but also in the legislative process will be increased by the Constitutional Draft such
that the aforementioned process of the development of the EU towards a federation is not in-
terrupted, the Parliament will have too little ability to effectively control and sanction European
policies.
A stronger separation of powers in the EU would be important as citizens’ ability to control
representatives at the EU level is considerably low. First, the current delegation of decision-
making powers to the Council of Ministers undermines their control possibilities. Each head of
state or of government can easily argue that unpopular measures were necessary because of
                                                                
9. Aside the separation of powers between state centers of power, the separation between the state and
the private society plays a crucial role which is however not further discussed in this paper.
10. The advantages and disadvantages of two chamber systems are however controversial. See Levmore
(1992), Mueller (1996, chap. 13) and Blankart and Mueller (2002). The latter find two chambers sys-
tems problematic after a discussion of the high blocking abilities of the German Bundesrat.9
compromises taken at the EU level. It is not necessarily unreasonable to enforce unpopular
measures at home via European institutions. It does however entail the danger that national
governments abuse EU decisions to realize their own personal objectives instead of following
citizens’ preferences and spread the resulting costs over the whole populace. Second, the
European Parliament has incentives to attract additional competencies in order to increase its
own decision-making powers and will thus not object against a further centralization in the EU
such that the discretion of the European and the national executives will further increase. Third,
the European peoples lack a European identity. They perceive themselves as Italians or
French, but not as European. This has important consequences for the ability to control gov-
ernments in the EU because the media will not be induced to exert its control to the same ex-
tent as it does at the national level.
11 This is the main reason why the EU needs a constitution:
The control of decision-making bodies at the EU level must be increased and the democratic
deficit must be reduced. Today, the EU shapes a big majority of legislative decisions of its
member countries without such a control. This is unacceptable.
The lacking European identity and the own narrow interest to increase its competencies
render it impossible to resolve the democratic deficit by giving more powers to the European
Parliament. A sufficient control of political decisions at the EU level will only be achieved by
establishing direct democratic instruments in the EU constitution. They provide incentives to
citizens to become informed about European politics. Referendums and initiatives hence shape
the emergence of a European demos. Moreover, referendums and initiatives presuppose a
lesser extent of cultural and historical agreement than the effective control of European institu-
tions by the European public in a representative democratic system. As direct democracy pro-
vides incentives to citizens to gather information about European policies, they start to examine
their own narrow individual interests that are still molded by national considerations by com-
paring it to the positions of citizens from other member states. It is crucial for that outcome that
a discussion process is established before European referendums take place. In contrast to the
arguments by Habermas and Derrida (2003),
12 referendums and initiatives would found a
European identity by actively reflecting European political issues instead of stretching the ex-
ternal threat of U.S. hegemony in external affairs.
3. Direct democracy for a European constitution
The arguments for the introduction of direct democratic decision-making procedures at the
EU level are hence obtained from a contractarian perspective: A constitution establishes the
rules for politics as well as the security mechanisms against an abuse of powers. From that
perspective, it is also excluded that those who are supposed to be restricted by these rules
have the decision-making powers to change those mechanisms of control and sanctioning. The
players should not be allowed to decide upon the rules of the game. In the European context,
                                                                
11. In an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the former Belgian Prime Minister and Vice
President of the Constitutional Convention, Jean-Luc Dehaene, criticized that the work of the Conven-
tion is not realized in many EU countries, although its meetings are public and it contains representa-
tives of national governments. See also „In Europa ist eine neue Alchemie entstanden“, in: Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung No 16, 20. January2003, p 7.
12. See: Böckenförde (2003); Grimm (2003); Muschg (2003); Starbatty (2003).10
members of parliament and government representatives should not have been allowed to be
members of the Constitutional Convention if they have national or European decision-making
powers after the Convention work. Pragmatic reasons may provide arguments to violate such
a requirement. This violation must however be cured by a final approval of the Constitutional
Treaty by the citizens.
The composition of the EU Convention has followed pragmatic reasons. The Convention
has consisted of three former heads of states as the presidency, 15 representatives of national
governments, 30 representatives of national parliaments, 16 members of the European Parlia-
ment, 2 representatives of the Commission, 13 representatives of governments of the candi-
date countries, and 26 representatives of the candidate countries’ national parliaments. With
the probable exception of the presidency, the members of the Convention remain in their for-
mer offices. Vaubel (2002) correctly argues that the members of the Convention therefore find
themselves in a potential conflict of interests between their own personal goals and the funda-
mental objectives of the constitution. It is hence necessary to institutionally enable European
citizens to decide the future European constitution in a mandatory constitutional referendum.
As they possess the competence competence to change constitutional provisions, a constitu-
tional referendum must be established in the EU constitution. According to an opinion poll by
EOS Gallup Europe (2003, p. 56), 41 percent of EU citizens currently find that such a refer-
endum is indispensable for the establishment of the European constitution. 45 percent still think
that it is useful. EU citizens themselves rationally perceive the necessity of direct democratic
decision-making in this case.
13
Aside the constitutional level, the advantages and disadvantages of referendums and initia-
tives must be considered as selective control and sanctioning mechanisms for political deci-
sions of legislatures and executives also in day-to-day politics.
14 While elements of representa-
tive democracy on the one hand entail decisions with a higher information content because a
division of labor enables representatives to specialize in politics, they increase principal-agent
problems and allow representatives in the government and the legislature to follow their own
interests to a higher extent on the other hand. Referendums provide citizens with a potential
veto of representatives’ decisions. Policy proposals that favor special interest groups, or rep-
resentatives’ personal or ideological interests will have difficulties to obtain a majority at the
ballots such that proper policies result that are guided by citizens’ interests. Initiatives enable
citizens to introduce new proposals to the political arena that have been neglected (on purpose
or not) by the classe politique. Changes in the political preferences of a polity are thus re-
flected to a larger extent in political outcomes. Besley and Coate (2000) show in addition that
initiatives provide means to unbundle issues that are linked in package deals via logrolling de-
vices whenever they are not in citizens’ interests.
                                                                
13. Just like a parliamentary decision, such a mandatory constitutional referendum does not only represent
a binary decision because an intensive discussion among European citizens will precede it. For the im-
portance of the discussion process for the diffusion of information in direct and representative democ-
racies see Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz (1999) as well as Feld and Kirchgässner (2000).
14. The political economy arguments for and against direct democracy have been discussed extensively in
the recent literature and are thus only briefly summarized here. See Gerber (1999), Kirchgässner, Feld
and Savioz (1999), Feld and Kirchgässner (2000, 2001a, 2003) and Matsusaka (2002).11
Many objections against instruments of direct democracy are brought forward in the litera-
ture and in political discussions. A look at theoretical and empirical studies reveals that they
are not sufficient to dismiss the option of direct democratic decision-making.
15 This holds first
with respect to the contention that ordinary citizens are cognitively unable to judge complex
political issues,
16 but second also with respect to the alleged dominance of interest group influ-
ence on policy outcomes in direct democracies.
17 Without discussing these issues at length, it
should be stated that the empirical studies by Pommerehne (1978) for Switzerland and Ger-
ber (1999) for the U.S. provide evidence that policy outcomes in jurisdictions with initiatives
and referendums are more strongly oriented at citizens’ preferences. Interest groups and the
ideology of political parties apparently have less influence in direct than in representative de-
mocracies such that policy outcomes are also less oriented at the positions of special interests
or parties.
Moreover, direct democratic jurisdictions follow a relatively rational economic and fiscal
policy according to an abundance of empirical studies. Citizens’ cognitive abilities for under-
standing complex political issues obviously suffice to reject unreasonable and approve reason-
able fiscal and economic policies. Studies for Switzerland and the U.S. show that Swiss can-
tons (and local jurisdictions) with fiscal referendums, and U.S. states with initiatives have – ce-
teris paribus – significantly lower public spending and revenue per capita and also lower pub-
lic debt per capita.
18 Referendums and initiatives mainly restrict social welfare spending
19 and
induce governments to finance their spending to a significantly higher extent by user charges
than by broad based taxes.
20 However, this does not necessarily mean that direct democracy
is associated with an erosion of the social welfare state. As Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner
(2003) show, direct democratic Swiss cantons redistribute less income if the income gap be-
tween the highest and lowest income decile is relatively low and redistribute significantly more
income if the income gap between the highest and lowest income decile is relatively high. In-
come redistribution appears to be more targeted in direct democratic cantons and hence more
effective such that less funds are necessary to achieve redistributive goals.  Pommerehne
(1983) and Barankay (2002) also provide evidence for a higher efficiency of public service
provision in direct democracies. Tax evasion is lower and tax morale higher in direct demo-
cratic jurisdictions.
21 They have a – ceteris paribus – significantly higher GDP per capita
22
                                                                
15. See Romer and Rosenthal (1979), Steunenberg (1992),  Feld and Kirchgässner (2001a),  Matsusaka
(2002) and Feld and Matsusaka (2003a).
16. See Matsusaka (1992), Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz (1999), Marino and Matsusaka (2000), Kessler
(2001), Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) and Benz and Stutzer (2003).
17. See Gerber (1999) for U.S. evidence and Longchamp (1991) as well as Feld and Schaltegger (2002) for
Swiss evidence.
18. See  Matsusaka  (1995, 2000, 2002) and  Kiewiet and  Szakaly  (1996) for the U.S. and  Feld and
Kirchgässner (1999, 2001a, 2001b), Feld and Matsusaka (2003a), Schaltegger (2001) and Vatter and
Freitag (2002) for Switzerland.
19. See Schaltegger (2001) and Vatter and Freitag (2002).
20. See Matsusaka (1995, 2002) for the U.S. and Feld and Matsusaka (2003b) for Switzerland.
21. See Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996), Pommerehne, Hart and Feld (1997), Feld and Frey
(2002a, 2002b) and Torgler (2002).12
and higher economic growth as compared to representative democratic jurisdictions.
23 Unsur-
prisingly, citizens in direct democratic jurisdictions are – ceteris paribus – more satisfied with
their lives as a whole.
24 The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the conjecture that an
insufficient control of representatives leads to a less reasonable economic policy. It can be ex-
pected that these effects are not qualitatively different if referendums and initiatives are used at
the EU level. European policy outcomes will be more strongly oriented at citizens’ prefer-
ences.
All in all, more arguments therefore speak in favor of the inclusion of referendums and ini-
tiatives in a future European constitution. Several proposals have been presented in the litera-
ture so far.
25 I follow a proposal by Feld and Kirchgässner (2003) according to which the
EU constitution should include the instruments of a mandatory constitutional referendum as
well as constitutional and legislative initiatives. Decisions that are approved in a mandatory ref-
erendum (and in the founding referendum on the Constitutional Draft) should not be subject to
changes by the Commission, nor by the Council, nor the Parliament without requiring addi-
tional popular approval. Referendum decisions are hence binding. The European Court of Jus-
tice should however have the possibility to assess whether constitutional changes are uncon-
stitutional or not. A constitutional referendum shall be approved if a double qualified majority
(two thirds) of the EU citizens and of the (citizens of the) member states support it. Further re-
strictions are not necessary. In particular, a turnout requirement should not be laid down in the
constitution. German historic experiences with turnout requirements provide strong evidence
that turnout requirements invite strategic behaviors of certain groups, parties and citizens.
In addition to the constitutional referendum as an institution of control, citizens should have
possibilities to change the constitution by own initiative. A constitutional initiative enables citi-
zens to induce institutional changes at the EU level if they perceive that changed circumstances
in European integration require it. For example, a re-assignment of competencies to the na-
tional level could be achieved relatively easily by proposing an initiative. EU citizens, the insti-
tutions of the EU and of the member states should basically have the possibility to propose a
constitutional initiative. The signature requirement should be 5 percent of the electorate. Ma-
tsusaka (1995) provides empirical evidence for the U.S.-states that initiatives do not have any
significant influence on fiscal policy for signature requirements of 10 percent and higher. The
signature requirement should thus be lower. The median of signature requirements of U.S.
states is 5 percent. When Switzerland introduced a constitutional initiative in 1891, it drafted a
signature requirement in absolute terms that was at about 5 percent then as well. Alternatively,
the signature requirement could be 15 percent from at least 5 member states, but at least 2
percent of the EU electorate overall.
26
                                                                                                                                                                                             
22. See Feld and Savioz (1997). The hypothesis of reversed causality is rejected according to the results.
23. See Freitag and Vatter (2000) for Switzerland and Blomberg and Hess (2002) for the U.S.
24. See Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002).
25. See the survey of the different proposals in Hug (2002, chap. 7). A proposal by Papadopoulos (2002) is
relatively close to ours in several respects.
26. With respect to the time available to collect signatures, the literature does not provide similar insights.
A generous regulation appears to be useful however. Even a signature requirement of 2 percent could
be very restrictive if only these signatures must be collected within one month.13
As in the case of the constitutional referendum, the constitutional initiative is adopted if a
double majority of EU citizens’ votes and of (the citizens of) the member states approve it.
Further restrictions are again not necessary. There should also not be any restrictions in con-
tent of a constitutional initiative. Whether a constitutional initiative is constitutional in the area of
basic human rights could be judged again by the ECJ before the initiative is decided upon.
Constitutional initiatives can be rejected if they are not constitutional. The role of the ECJ as a
constitutional court should however be restricted and less active in comparison to the U.S.
Supreme Court or the German Federal Constitutional Court.
27 Parliament and government
should have the right for a counterproposal which should be simultaneously decided at the
ballots together with the constitutional initiative. In contrast to the proposal for the constitu-
tional initiative, the legislative initiative could already be adopted by a simple majority of votes.
All other regulations of the constitutional initiative should apply accordingly to the legislative
initiative. The introduction of an optional referendum at the EU level is not suggested because it
would too strongly reduce the ability to reach decisions in European politics. An optional ref-
erendum would mainly affect EU directives. The important political decisions in Europe are
regulated in the future European constitution which already is subject to a mandatory referen-
dum. An optional referendum is hence abundant.
Finally, a fiscal referendum should be considered for introduction in the EU constitution. In
Switzerland and among the U.S. states, fiscal referendums are frequently found in addition to
the general constitutional or legislative referendums (or initiatives). Fiscal referendums allow for
a stronger control of fiscal policies. In the case of mandatory fiscal referendums, new spending
projects must be approved by citizens if the spending amount exceeds a certain threshold. Fis-
cal referendums also exists for issuing debt or changes of tax laws. If the European constitution
contained an EU tax, for example a surcharge on national revenues from value added taxes,
changes of tax rates and the tax basis would already be subject to the mandatory constitutional
referendum. Since the EU should not have any right to issue debt, a fiscal referendum on the
revenue side of the budget would not be necessary. At the spending side, a fiscal referendum
would be useful if the spending threshold were relatively high in order not to overburden the in-
strument. Bigger spending projects, like the creation of a new fund, would again require
changes of the European constitution. The assignment of new policy responsibilities will gener-
ally require constitutional changes in the EU such that a mandatory constitutional referendum
may again suffice to impose restrictions on EU spending. However, the EU will continue to
develop and might perhaps be able to demand much higher levels of funds. Although this might
look like too much speculation with respect to future developments, it might be reasonable to
include a fiscal referendum for new spending projects in the EU constitution already today.
Currently, the Constitutional Draft does not include any direct democratic decision-making
procedures. Under the title ‘Principles of Participatory Democracy’, Art. I-46 only pro-
vides for a petition right according to which at least a million EU citizens could invite the
Commission to propose legal drafts at the EU level. Detailed regulations should be fixed in a
                                                                
27. Hayek (1960, p. 245) clearly perceived the necessity to restrict judicial indpendence. He argued that the
restriction imposed upon the government in pursuing its goals by establishing general principles
should anticipate turbulences; judicial review however would require a kind of referendum as a general
call of the people to decide upon the general principles in order to complete it.14
specific law. In order to be considered as direct democratic, the petition right lacks the final
and conclusive right of citizens to take binding decisions. If the EU would propose a law or a
directive according to that petition proposal that is however finally decided by citizens in a ref-
erendum before it could come into force, it would constitute an indirect initiative. Without
binding decision by the citizens in politics, the EU will remain a representative democratic pol-
ity.
4. Competitive federalism for the European Union
4.1. The fundamental decision between federation or confederation
The fundamental decision between a confederation or a federation is one of the most im-
portant issues for European integration. Currently, the EU constitutes a hybrid entity in be-
tween both extremes, because EU decisions partly affect EU citizens directly and are partly
enacted by the governments of member states. The integration process in the EU is character-
ized by a centralization trend at least since the Single European Act that has accelerated since
the Maastricht Treaty. More and more policy areas are delegated more or less transparently
to the EU level. In more and more policy areas, EU member states are forced to coordinate
their policies. The EU instructs national parliaments to an increasing extent by formulating di-
rectives for European policies without having sufficient democratic legitimacy in its own right.
This situation cannot last forever. The EU needs to decide what its final status should be. Ei-
ther it should give back competencies to the member states and restrict itself to a confedera-
tion or it openly opts for centralization of competencies by founding a federation. In the latter
case, competencies for different policy areas should be transparently divided between the EU,
the member states and sub-national jurisdictions. Moreover, decision-making procedures in-
cluding agenda setting power for future assignments of competencies should be clearly defined.
The alternative organization of the EU, having a unitary state like France or the U.K., is not
feasible. According to McKay (2001), a federation must be distinguished from a unitary state
by the constitutional guarantee for a vertical separation of powers between a central (federal)
authority and the regional jurisdictions. A European unitary state would imply the abolition of
the European nation states by their inclusion in a new Europe. This must remain a utopia (for
some, and it is lucky for others) because preferences of the single member countries are so
much different that a strong opposition would object against such a proposal. It is remarkable
that comparatively big polities, like the EU could become, either have been a federation from
the beginning of their historical development, like the U.S., Canada, Australia or India, or en-
tered a decentralization process after a period of coerced standardization by a central author-
ity, like Russia, China, Spain and meanwhile even France. For a unitary state to be sustainable,
a considerable homogeneity of citizens’ preferences must moreover exist in the EU. As this is
currently not the case, such a unitary EU would be rejected by the citizens. The preferences of
the Spaniards, the French, the English and the Germans is still so different that a new European
solidarity, according to which financial assistance for all EU citizens is provided without ac-
knowledgement of national origin, cannot be expected for the foreseeable future. On the eve
of the creation of a Swiss federation, Napoleon is supposed to have had said that Switzerland15
will be federal or it will never be. Accordingly, it could be said: Europe will be federal or it
will never be.
4.2. Competitive or cooperative federalism?
If EU member states decide to found a European federation, they can choose between two
role models of federalism or combine different elements of them at least. On the one hand,
they can organize their relationships in a competitive federalism, on the other hand they could
choose a cooperative federalism type of federation. In both extremes, unambiguous assign-
ments of competencies are desirable. In a competitive federalism, far-reaching competencies
would remain in the exclusive jurisdiction of the member states. The competencies of the EU
would be clearly defined for particular policy areas that it finally decides upon. Even a com-
petitive federalism would not be able to exist without coordination of policies whenever nota-
ble spillovers of national policies to other member states exist. Competitive federalism does
however not exhibit a significant amount of harmonization of policies at the central level. It is
characterized by a diversity of policy solutions. This is different in cooperative federalism. The
centralization of competencies is relatively stronger than in competitive federalism. A larger
part of policies is harmonized. The coordination of policies of member states is extended to-
wards almost each policy area.
These two stylized ideals of both types of federalism do not exist in reality. Existing federa-
tions do not exactly follow any of these ideals, but exhibit different degrees of cooperation
between member states and different extents of centralization of policies. There is a steady
transition from competitive to cooperative federalism. McKay (2001) classifies the really ex-
isting federations with respect to two criteria, the extent of institutional centralization and the
degree of regional identity. Accordingly, Switzerland, Canada and the EU have a low degree
of centralization and strong regional identities, while the U.S., Germany and Australia (proba-
bly also Austria which is not mentioned there) have a high degree of centralization and weak
regional identities. Historical manifestations of these federations can be subsumed to the re-
maining permutations of the criteria. The U.S. are in that second group of countries because
McKay contends that it has a high centralization of the party system. In particular with respect
to the fiscal constitution, McKay’s classification is however contestable. The U.S. states have
far reaching fiscal competencies to a similar extent as the Swiss cantons that are both stronger
than those of the Canadian provinces. McKay’s classification in both groups does therefore
not correspond to the economic idea of competitive and cooperative federalism. More
strongly oriented at the fiscal competencies of the sub-federal jurisdictions, Canada, Switzer-
land and the U.S. belong to the group of competitive federalist countries while Australia, Aus-
tria and Germany exhibit a cooperative federalism. If the EU develops to a federation without
further centralization and harmonization in most policy areas, it will belong to the first group.
Given the strong national identities, it is reasonable to organize a future European federation in
such a competitive way.
Frequently, competitive federalism in particular with respect to fiscal policies is strongly
criticized by a number of arguments.
28 Theoretically, fiscal competition between jurisdictions
                                                                
28. For an extensive discussion of advantages and disadvantages of fiscal competition and the empirical
evidence see Feld (2000a) and Wellisch (2000).16
can lead to negative outcomes if externalities exist or income redistribution is decentralized.
For example, positive regional externalities or benefit spillovers might emerge if Dutch tourists
use the German highway system, but do not contribute according to their marginal willingness
to pay. Congestion externalities will result. Negative regional externalities or cost spillovers
exist in the case of tax exporting. It provides incentives for inefficiently high levels of public
services because a part of the tax burden to finance these services is paid by residents from
other jurisdictions. An example are multinational corporations whose shares are internationally
distributed. Because the shareholders of a multinational cannot participate to the same extent in
the political process as those of a national corporation, a government has incentives to raise
corporate income taxes to inefficiently high levels above the willingness to pay of those share-
holders. The costs of public services are externalized.
Fiscal externalities may arise in the tax and subsidy competition for mobile capital. Germany
is for example in tax competition with Ireland. If Ireland drops the corporate income tax rate, it
attracts German firms. This relocation reduces the tax burden of the Irish residents given a
fixed amount of public goods and services because provision costs can be distributed among
more taxpayers. However, the relocation increases the tax burden of German residents be-
cause less taxpayers have to finance that given amount of German public services. If both
countries do not consider the changes in tax burdens in each country when deciding about the
level of public services, fiscal externalities arise. This argument does not hold to the same ex-
tent if public infrastructure is becoming an additional parameter for relocation decisions. Infra-
structure is adjusted in the fiscal competition game such that fiscal externalities might finally
vanish. An inefficient provision of public services might only result if economies of scale (non-
rivalness) in consumption exist, i.e. when the government provides public goods in the Samuel-
sonian sense (Sinn 1997, 2003a). Fiscal competition enforces the benefit principle of taxation
such that mobile production factors can only be charged the marginal costs of their use of pub-
lic goods. Mobile taxpayers do however not contribute to cover the high inframarginal (fixed)
costs of public infrastructure. If this were not to lead to an inefficiently low level of public
services, the fixed costs must be covered by immobile taxpayers. This can lead to an unde-
sired income distribution.
With respect to personal income redistribution, fiscal competition poses similar problems.
Continue the Germany-Ireland example: Germany presumably has a higher progressivity of in-
come taxes and pays higher levels of social transfers than Ireland. Income redistribution is
hence more pronounced in Germany than in Ireland. This provides incentives for Irish social
welfare recipients to move to Germany because they can expect higher transfer payments.
High income earners from Germany – ceteris paribus – follow the incentive to emigrate to
Ireland. These migration incentives impede the decentralized income redistribution at the na-
tional levels. There do not exist many theoretical arguments against this reasoning. A frequently
heard argument is that high income and wealthy people have incentives to voluntarily contribute
to the social welfare state in order to obtain social peace. The voluntary income redistribution
is the higher the more decentralized the organization of income redistribution is because recipi-
ents are known or can be more easily identified by contributors. Many observers question
whether the funds obtained from voluntary contributions to income redistribution suffice to se-
cure a minimum income of the poor. If income redistribution is considered necessary, the dis-
advantage of fiscal competition may theoretically be found in the distribution section.17
In the political discussion, a frequent argument focuses on regional income positions. It is
contended that fiscal competition results in a situation of poor regions becoming poorer and
rich regions becoming richer. The more ‘good’ taxpayers reside in a region, the lower the tax
burden needs to be to finance a ‘necessary’ amount of infrastructure. Poor regions however
need to increase the tax burden to finance such a ‘necessary’ amount of infrastructure. Fiscal
competition then perpetuates income differentials and exacerbates the convergence problems
of the periphery. Such permanent differences in growth performances will however also prevail
if agglomeration economies in central regions exist. The competition between interregionally
active firms induces a concentration of industrial activities in economic centers because of an
interaction between economies of scale in production, agglomeration economies and dis-
economies and transport costs. Economic activity is more concentrated in the center while the
periphery has below average economic activity. Baldwin and Krugman (2000) analyze the
impact of tax competition on the economic development of central and peripheral regions un-
der the conditions normally emphasized by economic geography. Agglomeration economies in
the centers allow them to a certain extent to levy relatively higher taxes than the periphery
without inducing firms to relocate to the periphery with lower taxes. The periphery has how-
ever no other alternative than to attempt at compensating their location disadvantages by levy-
ing lower taxes. A strong decrease of tax rates is necessary to compensate for agglomeration
advantages of the center. Ireland has followed this policy in the EU during the last decade and
has been very successful. Tax harmonization would then be harmful because it would exacer-
bate the resource differences between center and periphery and easily lead to demands for
higher fiscal equalization.
From the perspective of systems competition, personal income redistribution thus appears
to be the only area where problems from fiscal competition might emerge. Fiscal externalities
are empirically unimportant or at least compensated for by the effects of tax exporting (Søren-
sen 2003). Benefit spillovers can be relatively successfully corrected for by decentralized bar-
gaining arrangements that induce a Coase like solution as an internalization device (Wellisch
2000). Experiences from existing federal states like Switzerland or the U.S. support this hy-
pothesis (Pommerehne and Krebs 1991). By and large the existing empirical evidence sug-
gests that the advantage of fiscal competition can be found in the allocative branch (Inman and
Rubinfeld 1997, Feld and Kirchgässner 1997, Feld 2000a). Fiscal competition increases
the efficiency of the public sector.
However, distributive problems need to be taken seriously in a European competitive fed-
eralism. If the economic pressure on European welfare states increases because of transfer in-
duced migration from Eastern European countries, the political need to harmonize social sys-
tems in Europe will increase as well. The Commission aims at a social union already today.
Such a harmonization at presumably high transfer levels will lead to unemployment in the pe-
riphery that does not yet obtain the high wages and incomes of the central regions, because
social transfers will be higher than wages of low skilled workers in these countries. The con-
vergence process of these regions will be interrupted such that they demand higher grants from
the European center to compensate for their loss of competitiveness. A similar process has
followed the social union of the East German states after re-unification. Sinn (1997, 2003a)
therefore suggest to establish a nationality principle in the EU. According to the earlier version
of Sinn’s proposal, citizens should obtain transfers according to the mandates of their home18
country for a clearly defined time period, say five years. They should also pay income taxes
according to the mandates of their home country. These contributions to and the transfers from
a particular welfare state take place independent from the place of residence. Hence the resi-
dence principle is replaced by a nationality principle. This proposal is reasonable in several re-
spects because the incentives of migration in order to avoid the rules of income redistribution
of the home country are reduced. If the nationality principle holds, the welfare state is not
eroded by fiscal competition. However, this strong version of the nationality principle is too
far-reaching and neglects the fact that a state then has a too strong ability to exploit citizens by
excessive taxation. In such a system, they cannot escape the infringement of Leviathan states.
In the U.S. and in Switzerland, partially successful examples of elements of a nationality
principle existed in the recent past. Until 1969, the U.S. states imposed residence require-
ments on potential welfare recipients according to which they could only obtain welfare pay-
ments in a state if they had worked at least two years in the same state in which they applied
for social welfare. The residence requirement was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in that year such that evidence for a harmful welfare migration has been provided only
after that Supreme Court decision. In Switzerland, a citizenship principle existed until 1979 ac-
cording to which the places of citizenship were responsible for social welfare of their citizens.
Citizenship has been inherited. If the place of residence of a welfare recipient was different
from the place of citizenship, he could be forced to move back in the place of citizenship or
obtained lower transfer payments than he would have received at the place of residence. The
empirical evidence by Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) and Feld (2000b) supports
the positive role of the citizenship principle in Switzerland for a sustainable fiscal competition.
The proposals by the European Convention to establish a European citizenship (Art. I-8 of the
Constitutional Draft) together with non-discrimination (Art. I-4) and the positive right for social
protection (Art. II-34) impose strong restrictions on the introduction of a citizenship princi-
ple.
29 If the current proposal of the Convention is realized, the ECJ will probably not be able
to accept that a Portuguese citizen living in Germany will receive social welfare payments at the
Portuguese level only. It is hence necessary to introduce a weak form of the nationality princi-
ple explicitly in the EU constitution as a restriction on the inclusive principle of EU citizenship.
The preservation of an effective competitive federalism in Europe is also desirable because
competition between member states helps to resolve public choice distortions. The state does
not always do what it ought to. Political actors follow their own self-interest and seek to get
rents from the political process. If a government of a member country attempts at securing pri-
vate rents by increasing taxes, taxpayers can avoid excessive taxation by migrating to countries
with lower tax burdens. The government cannot increase the tax burden of the mobile factor
above the level of migration costs. It therefore has to take the interests of the mobile factors
into account. Competitive federalism preserves a realistic possibility of migration. In addition,
federalism enables citizens to comparatively evaluate the performances of representatives and
hence reduce the information asymmetries in political markets. For example, German voters
can compare the performance of the German federal government to that of the French gov-
ernment. If France has a comparably high level and quality of public services under otherwise
same conditions, but offers them to lower tax prices than Germany, German voters have in-
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centives to throw the German government out of office at the next election day. The German
government will anticipate this threat in its decision to increase tax rates. Federalism does
hence not only work through the migration mechanism, but also improves citizens’ ability to
exert voice in the political process. The government is forced to provide public services at
relatively lower costs and at the level desired by citizens.
30 Sinn’s (2003b) proposal for a na-
tionality principle for a sustainable decentralized income redistribution in the EU should there-
fore only by applied to social transfers, but not to income taxation in order to prevent the fisc
from exploiting taxpayers. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finan-
zen (2001) and meanwhile also Sinn (2003c) suggest to apply the nationality principle only to
transfers.
With respect to fiscal policy coordination, the Constitutional Draft is relatively cautious. The
Convention has not given way to calls for more tax harmonization. Aside the harmonization of
indirect taxes which resulted from the completion of the single market, the possibility for tax
coordination in direct taxation, in particular company taxation, has been included only with re-
spect to illegal tax fraud in Art. III-63 of the Constitutional Draft. It is the only case for which
the unanimity requirement for taxation issues in the Council is softened. The potential exhaus-
tion of this new article will not undermine tax competition between EU member states. The EU
is thus still following the principle of competitive federalism in taxation. Further rules that ex-
ceed the status quo regulations in fiscal issues are not included in the Constitutional Draft.
4.3. Assignment of competencies and subsidiarity
A federal EU needs clearly assigned competencies to avoid conflicts between the EU level
and the member states. The economic theory of federalism provides insights to such a rational
assignment of competencies. The EU should provide those public goods and services whose
benefits are reaped by all member states. In addition to the common market that meanwhile
also includes the common monetary policy, trade policy and European competition policy,
external affairs and defense may fall under the jurisdiction of the EU according to a few
authors (see, e.g., Tabellini, 2003b). Defense is however already internationally coordinated
and harmonized in the NATO the priority of which should not be questioned by the EU even if
it takes a supplementary role to resolve local conflicts. A stronger coordination of external af-
fairs at the EU level appears to reasonable in order to effectively influence the peaceful living
together of people. In the Constitutional Draft, the Convention follows this proposal by creat-
ing a European minister of foreign affairs. The provisions for this new institution are problem-
atic because of the potential conflict of competencies between the minister of foreign affairs
and the president of the European Council who should represent the EU externally. The as-
signment of competencies of both institutions in the Constitutional Draft provides insufficient
regulation for conflicts, such that the EU constitution needs to be revised in that respect.
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(2000, 2003). A secession right improves minority protection in the EU and increases the competitive
pressure on governments. Art. I-59 of the Constitutional Draft explicitly considers a secession right.20
In the field of public security, police and the judiciary, the considerably increased globaliza-
tion of crime and terrorism demands more coordination between member states.
31 Again, the
Constitutional Draft correctly considers a coordination in that field. The preferences of mem-
ber states in public security are however very different, such that a centralization or harmoniza-
tion of European criminal laws is not useful. Member states should keep their competencies in
that field. Several important questions are however not resolved by stating a predominant
competence of members states in that field. For example, the Constitutional Draft establishes
an origin principle in criminal procedures and in the collection of evidence. European national
codes of criminal procedure differ however widely. An origin principle in criminal procedures
implies that a country must accept evidence in an international criminal case that it would have
to reject according to its own code of criminal procedure otherwise. For example, France al-
lows the consideration of witnesses without their personal testimony. The U.K. and Germany
do not allow for such a ‘witnessing from hearsay’ and they might have good reason to do so in
light of the potential manipulation of such a testimony by official investigators. According to the
origin principle in criminal procedure, evidence is correctly treated as an internationally trad-
able good. Whether this tradability is restricted or not by the characteristics of that good is
however not discussed.
Moreover, the EU should have competencies to correct externalities that affect all member
states (Feld and Kirchgässner 1996). Cross border externalities are not in the jurisdiction of
the EU because they could be resolved by negotiations between respective member states. A
comprehensive competence of the EU in environmental policy is thus not required. Common
agricultural policy and structural as well as industrial policies are not having characteristics of
European wide public goods in the conceptual sense and should thus not be in the jurisdiction
of the EU. In fact, they are the main policies for which the EU budget pays. In a public choice
analysis, Folkers (1995) explains their existence by the necessity to compensate potential los-
ers of European integration in particular member states. For political-economic reasons, a re-
assignment of competencies in these areas will however be very difficult if not impossible.
The Constitutional Draft achieves considerable progress in the assignment of competencies
in the EU. In Art. I-12 to I-17, the exclusive competencies of the EU in monetary policy, trade
policy and the customs union are enumerated. The area of common competencies is however
too much expanded. On the one hand, there are reasonable common competencies of the EU
and the member states with respect to the common market and public security as well as agri-
cultural policy. The latter would at least keep the door open for an increasing role of member
states in agricultural policy such that several inefficiencies could be reduced. On the other
hand, there are questionable common competencies in social policy, infrastructural policy and
so on. Although those provisions reflect the status quo, a reduction of EU influence in these
fields would be useful. Particularly the EU competencies in social policy (Art. III-103 to III-
112) must be evaluated very critically. Against the background of the above formulated pro-
posal for a weak nationality principle, such EU competencies are neither necessary, nor rea-
sonable. If a nationality principle existed, income redistribution via social security and social
policy does not need to be coordinated at the EU level. The constitution should only establish
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the nationality principle by changing Art. II-34 accordingly (Sinn 2003b, 2003c, p. 444). The
EU responsibility for employment policy established by Art. I-14 is however a real fall from
grace. The sclerotic European (continental) labor markets need deregulation and less union
power. European employment policy currently mainly aims at active labor market policy which
has proven to be ineffective measured against the goal of improving employment probabilities
of the unemployed and too costly at least in Germany. Cracking union power in continental
Europe cannot be accomplished by the EU because it requires the political will of member
states instead of the EU as a scapegoat for unpopular deregulation. The competition between
national labor market institutions is better suited to trigger a sustainable reform than any coor-
dinating activities of the EU. Competition is key to change labor market outcomes. Collusion
and coordination between social partners already prevails for way too much time. An EU re-
sponsibility for labor market policy instead resembles the assignment of powers to organize
collusion. Similarly, the EU should not have competencies in cultural affairs or education.
Health policy requires more market than state and hence no European state. In any of these
policy, it is unacceptable that the EU is supposed to play a particular role.
The European budget is financed by revenue from tariffs and contributions from member
states which are calculated on the basis of national VAT revenue as well as member states’
GNP. The contribution system together with the balanced budget requirement for the EU
budget have proven successful (Blankart and Kirchner 2003). However, the second German
empire and the young Swiss federation in the 19
th century provide evidence that such contri-
bution systems are unstable. If the EU is assigned further competencies, for example in exter-
nal affairs and security policy, additional finances will be needed that can be covered less and
less easily by contributions. For such an eventuality, a reasonable assignment of taxing powers
should be considered: If the EU had a power to tax, which taxation competencies should be
assigned to the EU? The economic theory of federalism suggests to assign competencies for
progressive income taxes at the highest possible level because of the above-mentioned argu-
ments against decentralized income redistribution (Biehl 1985). From a political economy per-
spective, progressive taxes have a crucial disadvantage however. The central level will not
need to decide upon tax increases explicitly, but receives additional tax revenue because of
economic growth or bracket creep. Indirect taxes have the advantage that citizens exert a
stronger control on tax policy in the EU because additional revenue may only be obtained if
tax rates are explicitly increased or tax bases are explicitly broadened. Hence, representatives
are forced to justify tax changes in order to get the permission from citizens to levy higher
taxes. Such a necessity does not exist in the case of direct progressive taxes. Kirchgässner
(1994), Schneider (1996) and Feld and Kirchgässner (2003) make such a proposal: If the
EU had a power to tax, it should be an indirect tax, for example a surcharge on VAT revenue
of member states. The EU will however not need any right to issue debt because it should not
have any far reaching competencies in countercyclical macroeconomic policy or in social pol-
icy.
The decision-making procedures to change an assignment of competencies appear to be
more important than a specific assignment of competencies. The subsidiarity principle of Art.
I-9 of the Constitutional Draft (together with the flexibility clause of Art. I-17) is insufficient to
clearly define changes in responsibilities in the Union. Although it formulates the basic conjec-
ture that a decentralized provision of public services is advantageous, the basic power to22
change the assignment of competencies remains in the hands of EU decision-making bodies.
The Commission, the Parliament and the ECJ have an inherent interest in extending their com-
petencies and presumably decide in favor of a European responsibility. The member states in
the (European) Council on the one hand have incentives to keep their national competencies.
On the other hand, log-rolling in the Council has frequently led to a centralization to the Euro-
pean level. Log-rolling possibilities will be extended after the Constitutional Draft will have
been adopted, because unanimity voting will be less often required and the new qualified ma-
jority voting requires lower thresholds for minimum winning coalitions. It can be expected that
more centralization coalitions will turn out afterwards. Again, Swiss history provides many ex-
amples that a coalition of the federal level and the poorer cantons against the rich cantons led
to a centralization of social policy (Sommer 1978).
Two institutional mechanisms enable a rational weighing as to whether the EU should be as-
signed a responsibility. First, the  European Constitutional Group (2003) and  Vaubel
(1996) propose to establish a subsidiarity court comprised of judges from the national highest
courts. A subsidiarity court would have incentives to give the EU level relatively little compe-
tencies because those judges would deprive themselves of decision-making powers at the na-
tional level. It also implies however that they might allow for too little centralization in cases of
reasonable changes of responsibilities. Moreover, the subsidiarity court would have difficulties
to enforce a re-assignment of competencies to the national level. Second, a centralization of
competencies should trigger a mandatory constitutional referendum according to the provisions
outlined above. This proposal allows for a greater flexibility and does not require an additional
European institution. Feld, Schaltegger and Schnellenbach (2003) indeed provide strong
evidence for Switzerland, that fiscal policies is less centralized if citizens can decide in a refer-
endum. These results are corroborated by evidence for the U.S. states (Matsusaka 1995,
2002). Blankart (2000) emphasizes that the referendum requirement was crucial for Switzer-
land to centralize less powers than Germany in similar historical situations.
5. Conclusions
The EU has entered the process of giving itself a constitution. This recent development of
European integration should obtain much attention by political economists. Even if the failure of
the Brussels summit in December 2003 may not be cured by the summits of 2004, the in-
tended deepening of integration between France and Germany in a Europe of flexible integra-
tion will need to reply to the same challenges and will require a constitution. Attention is crucial
because a constitution with clearly defined rules to restrict state authorities and an unambigu-
ous assignment of competencies is indispensable to protect the rights EU citizens and to secure
a sustainable economic development in Europe. The protection of citizens’ rights is obtained
by establishing basic human rights, an independent judiciary and a separation of powers. Sus-
tainable economic development is triggered by competitive federalism. Whether a European
federation is desired or not: The conscious decision for a centralization in certain policy areas
is preferable to the creeping centralization that currently prevails in the EU because the latter
creates facts that cannot be changed easily in a world with strong political path-dependencies.
A creeping centralization will presumably end in a European federation as well, but probably
produces less favorable constitutional rules.23
It is particularly desirable to ensure competitive federalism in Europe. A harmonization of
policies in the sense of a German-style cooperative federalism would require fiscal transfers
between central regions and the European periphery to an unprecedented extent. This will be
unacceptable to citizens who are still not prepared to redistribute income to a larger extent
between member states. In addition, many political economic arguments speak in favor of
competitive federalism. Citizens can more easily avoid excessive taxation and restrict fiscal
policy. Yardstick competition between member states will become more intensive such that
the informational disadvantage of citizens is reduced. In order to secure these positive forces
of competitive federalism, transfer induced migration must be prevented. A weak nationality
principle according to which citizens may obtain welfare payments at the level of their home
country for a certain time period independent from the place of residence will reduce transfer
induced migration.
Following Feld and Kirchgässner (2003), a mandatory constitutional referendum as well
as a constitutional and a legislative initiative should be included in the EU constitution. The in-
troduction of a fiscal referendum appears to be reasonable in the light of a more powerful EU
in the future that demands more financial resources. The democratic foundation of political de-
cisions is a key condition for the acceptance of the EU constitution among citizens. Referen-
dums and initiatives will reduce the democratic deficit in the EU to a much larger extent than
increasing competencies for the European Parliament could achieve. Direct democratic institu-
tions allow for a stronger control of representatives at the EU level and help to shape a Euro-
pean identity. Citizens will have increased incentives to discuss European policy issues such
that a common understanding of EU policy can develop. In that respect, Switzerland again
provides an interesting example. When the Swiss federation was created in 1847, only canto-
nal demoi, but no national demos existed. Hug (2002, chap. 6) provides evidence that direct
democracy shaped the emergence of a Swiss identity. He also warns however to expect too
much from direct democracy in that respect. Too little is known about the mechanisms that in-
duce citizens to examine their own narrow individual interests that are still molded by regional
considerations in favor of a new national identity. Instead, national interests might be reinforced
at the EU level if direct democratic institutions are available. European integration might be
postponed for a longer time. The democratic deficit in the EU is nonetheless unacceptable. It is
thus time to develop a European democratic culture.
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